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The choice overload effect emerged as a rebuttal to the notion that having more options
from which to choose is always preferable. Jessup, Veinott, Todd, and Busemeyer
(2009) used a modified version of decision field theory, a cognitive process model of
choice, to generate multiple mechanisms based on psychological principles for the
choice overload effect as it pertains to choice probability. Here we experimentally
tested 2 of these mechanisms—time out and preference change—in a virtual hiring task
to see whether participants hired more applicants when choosing from small relative to
large sets of applicants. We further wanted to observe how the distribution of options
affected choice. The choice overload effect replicated. More importantly, we observed
that the time out mechanism did indeed account for choice overload effects, whereas
the conflict-based preference change mechanism did not. Model fitting via simulation
provided converging support because the time-out model provided a superior fit relative
to the preference change model. This further demonstrates the value of utilizing models
that incorporate underlying cognitive processes when exploring behaviors of interest to
psychology, marketing, economics, and other related disciplines.
Keywords: choice overload, hiring, consumer choice, time pressure, conflict
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In the summer of 2012, Apple’s Genius Training Student Workbook, a manual for new Apple
store employees, was leaked to the public. Nestled
among old sales techniques is advice based on
more recent research: never present more than
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three options at once (Biddle, 2012). This is just
one example of the popularization of research on
choice overload, due in no small part to
Schwartz’s (2004) The Paradox of Choice.
Standard economic models predict that an
abundance of options will increase the likelihood
of a purchase (Baumol & Ide, 1956). Curiously,
Iyengar and Lepper (2000) demonstrated the opposite effect, finding that customers purchased
more exotic jams from a display of six compared
with 24 options. This effect of choice overload has
been demonstrated with a wide variety of
choices (Gourville & Soman, 2005; Haynes,
2009; Iyengar, Huberman, & Jiang, 2004;
Iyengar et al., 2000; Ketcham, Lucarelli, Miravete, & Roebuck, 2012; Morrin, Broniarczyk, Inman, & Broussard, 2008; Park & Jang,
2013; Reutskaja & Hogarth, 2009).
Two recent meta-analyses of this literature
have yielded conflicting results. Scheibehenne,
Greifeneder, and Todd (2010) examined pub-
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lished and unpublished data and concluded that
chance might best explain the effect because the
effect often failed to replicate. However, they
stated that particular moderator variables might
provoke the effect and the lack of theory-driven
approaches may have hampered reliable observations of it. The more recent meta-analysis
considered more data sets—all published—and
explicitly tested the effects of four variables:
decision task difficulty, choice set complexity,
preference uncertainty, and decision goal, observing that all four moderate assortment sizebased choice overload effects (Chernev, Böckenholt, & Goodman, 2015). However, because
they were limited by previous research, their
moderator categories were rather broad. For example, they classified both time pressure and
conflict within the decision difficulty moderator. Yet these two causes elicit phenomenologically different feelings, as in, one can feel
extreme time pressure but very little conflict; or,
as in the case of a marriage decision, little time
pressure but much conflict.
Most choice overload research has primarily
involved observation of the effect, followed by
the establishment of boundary conditions regarding the circumstances in which the effect
will occur. Jessup et al. (2009) introduced a
unique approach: They took an existing process
model of choice that yields behavior based on
underlying cognitive mechanisms and extended
it to the no-choice domain (see Bhatia & Mullett, 2016 for a similar approach). The utility of
their approach is that it views the problem in
terms of why and how rather than what. Moreover, the answers to these questions generate
new and testable predictions.
Jessup et al. (2009) began with decision field
theory (Busemeyer & Townsend, 1993), a dynamic and stochastic model of choice within a
class of cognitive process models that explains a
wide array of decision phenomena in the consumer (Roe, Busemeyer, & Townsend, 2001),
psychological (Busemeyer et al., 1993; Johnson &
Busemeyer, 2005), and economic literature (Diederich & Busemeyer, 1999; Rieskamp, Busemeyer, & Mellers, 2006). Decision field theory
can be considered a dynamic version of signal
detection theory uniting expected utility with
Bayesian inference (Green & Swets, 1966). In
decision field theory, attention shifts back and
forth between the attributes at each time step to
generate momentary evaluations for each option.

These evaluations accumulate into preferences for
each option, which necessarily drift over time.
When preference for an option hits a predetermined decision threshold , the choice process
ends and that option is selected (see Figure 1). As
written, this model always results in the selection
of an option. To account for choice overload effects, Jessup et al. (2009) proposed three independent modifications— each grounded in psychological principles—to convert decision field theory
from a forced choice model to one that could elect
not to choose.
The three mechanisms were labeled preference change, time out, and the no-choice option.
Although the last of these successfully predicted not choosing in other consumer situations (Busemeyer, Johnson, & Jessup, 2006), it
did not predict the choice overload effect. However, the other two did.
The first mechanism, preference change, depends on the elements of conflict and dynamic
preferences. In a situation with high conflict, a
decision maker might vacillate between alternatives (e.g., at one moment option 1 is most preferred and at the next moment option 2 is most
preferred). The dynamic and stochastic nature of
decision field theory naturally produces such effects, wherein the most preferred (or lead) option
can change repeatedly. The relevant proposed
modification was to add a lead change threshold
␦. If the number of changes of the most preferred
option hits that threshold, then the decision maker
exits the choice process and makes no selection,
essentially declaring that this choice is too difficult
(see Figure 2). Effectively, this might represent
one mathematical instantiation of other conflictbased mechanisms for choice deferral (Dhar,
1997; Tversky & Shafir, 1992).
The second mechanism, time out, derives from
the idea that decision makers might feel time
pressure and so set a time limit for themselves
when deciding. Because preferences in decision
field theory evolve over time, this represents a
natural extension to the theory. The relevant proposed modification was to add a temporal threshold . If the deliberation process arrives at 
before an option is selected, then the process ends
and no option is selected (see Figure 3). Effectively, the decision maker declares that this choice
takes too long. This might represent a mathematical implementation of explanations for choice
deferral based on time pressure (Dhar & Nowlis,
1999; Haynes, 2009).
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Figure 1. Process illustration of decision field theory. The vertical axis represents the
preference state (i.e., accumulated preference) and the horizontal axis represents decision time
in arbitrary units. In this example showing three options (1, 2, and 3), preference for each
option accumulates across time, and the first option to reach the decision threshold (black
horizontal line at y ⫽ 1) is chosen. Here option 3 (dotted blue line) is chosen at approximately
time step 1,780. If the decision threshold were reduced to 0.25, then option 1 would instead
be chosen at approximately time step 100. The gray shaded area denotes that the choice
process has been exited. See the online article for the color version of this figure.

Critically, Jessup, et al. (2009) further considered the impact of the option set distribution,
considering both uniformly (where there is much
conflict) and exponentially distributed option sets
(in which an option dominates). They then used
simulations to test these modifications and their
interactions with the two-option set distributions,
yielding three predictions. First, the preference
change mechanism predicted the presence of a
choice overload effect when options were uniformly but not exponentially distributed. Second,
the time-out mechanism predicted the presence of
a choice overload effect in both distribution types
among individuals under time pressure. Third, the
time-out mechanism predicted that exponentially

distributed option sets may exacerbate the choice
overload effect among individuals under time
pressure. In this study we experimentally test
these two competing mechanisms, both classified
within the decision difficulty moderator of Chernev et al. (2015).
Method
Participants
Ninety participants— 49 female and 41
male—were recruited using flyers and ads
placed throughout the university campus or received course credit for participation in addition

This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.

140

JESSUP, RITCHIE, AND HOMER

Figure 2. Preference change mechanism implemented in decision field theory. The vertical axis
represents the preference state (i.e., accumulated preference) and the horizontal axis represents
decision time in arbitrary units. For every time step on which a different option becomes most
preferred (denoted by the circles), the preference change counter is incremented. If this counter
value reaches the tolerance threshold for preference changes before an option reaches the decision
threshold, then the process will stop and no option will be selected. Here the tolerance threshold
was set to a value of 10 and reached at approximately time step 650. The lower left quadrant
presents a hypothetical close-up of two preference changes. The gray shaded area denotes that the
choice process has been exited. See the online article for the color version of this figure.

to financial incentives (described below). All of
the participants from 1 day were removed because they were obtained using a nonstandard
sampling procedure, 11 in total.1 However, all
statistical conclusions regarding our hypotheses
were identical when using all participants in the
analysis. In total, we sought to collect data from
approximately 80 –90 participants; our stopping
rule was driven by the amount of money we had
available to pay participants.
Procedure
Each participant gave informed consent and
the study was approved by the university insti-

tutional review board. All participants then
completed the Regret and Maximizer scale2
(RAMS; Schwartz et al., 2002). They learned
that they would complete a virtual hiring task

1

Ten of 11 of these participants were studying where the
experiment was to take place and so were asked to take part
as well. After being informed of the $4 participation minimum, one of these individuals clarified, “You mean we get
money, no matter what happens?” Because of the anonymizing procedure used, we were unable to determine which
one participant volunteered under the standard protocol, so
all 11 were removed.
2
A recording error caused us to lose the last item on the
scale for each participant.
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Figure 3. Time-out mechanism implemented in decision field theory. The vertical axis
represents the preference state (i.e., accumulated preference) and the horizontal axis represents decision time in arbitrary units. If the time threshold (thick vertical line at approximately
1,000 time units) is reached before an option reaches the decision threshold, then the process
will stop and no option will be selected. Here the process ended without any option being
selected. The gray shaded area denotes that the choice process has been exited. See the online
article for the color version of this figure.

and they received instructions. They were informed that they would either win or lose
money on the basis of who they hired, and,
critically, that if they were unsure on any trial
about whom to hire, it was safest to hire no one.
At the end of the experiment, participants received the greater of either $4 or the sum of the
money they earned over all choices— divided
by 1000 — on the basis of their hiring decisions.
Participants then completed eight practice trials that were identical for all participants except
for the time allowed. The first four showed 15
job candidates and advised the participants on
the overall quality of the candidates; in one set
they were told to reject all of the candidates and
in another they were told that several were

strong and they should select one. The second
four practice trials consisted of one trial each
from our two option set sizes and two different
distribution types timed exactly as in the actual
task with no feedback provided.
The task consisted of 80 hiring decisions. Participants could choose to hire any of the available
applicants by pressing a corresponding button or
they could choose none of the applicants. For the
latter, they could either let the trial time out or
press a button indicating they wanted to hire none
of the current applicants.
We separated participants into two groups: no
time pressure and high time pressure (120 or 5 s
per decision, respectively). Each decision contained either a large (15) or small (three) set of job
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applicants. Applicant quality—which was demonstrated by four unique attributes relevant to personnel decisions (years of experience, standardized exam scores, college grade point average, and
letter of recommendation quality)—was either exponentially or uniformly distributed. Each small
option set contained the best, middle, and worst
options from a corresponding large option set (see
example in Figure 4), akin to the procedure used
by Iyengar et al. (2000). Applicant quality was
determined using a linear model using the attributes as inputs. (See the online supplemental materials for additional information concerning the
determination of applicant quality and additional
instructions).
After each set of 20 trials (containing 10 large
option set trials and their matching small option
set trials within a randomized order), participants
received feedback concerning their choices, indicating their earnings for each trial, a value that
represented a noisy estimate of the true underlying
quality of the chosen applicant derived from the
linear model mentioned above. The feedback
screen merely listed the payoffs for each of the
options selected during the block of 20 trials
(ranging from 0 listed payoffs up to 20, if an
option was selected on every trial). We used this
approach to minimize the impact of feedback on
choice throughout the experiment (Jessup,
Bishara, & Busemeyer, 2008). (See the online
supplemental materials for additional information
concerning creation of the applicant distributions).
Although our data are presented as a single experiment, the within-subjects nature of our design
contains 80 trials per participant consisting of 20
replications for each of the four conditions. Hence,
our design contains the same amount of data as 20
experiments using a between-subjects design,
each with an N of 4 ⫻ 79 ⫽ 316 participants.3
Analysis and Predictions
The time-pressure manipulation was intended
to force individuals to set a temporal threshold
as implemented by the time-out explanation.
The goal of this manipulation was to see
whether, when setting such a threshold, individuals demonstrated the choice overload effect as
predicted. The high-pressure group was contrasted with the no-pressure group, which
served as a control. The different distribution
within option sets was intended to test the preference change explanation. Here the uniform

distribution of options is predicted to elicit
choice overload, in contrast to exponentially
distributed options which served as a control
condition.
We analyzed the data using a 2 ⫻ 2 ⫻ 2
mixed ANOVA with two within-subjects factors: distribution type (exponential or uniform)
and set size (large or small), and one betweensubjects factor: time pressure (no pressure or
high pressure) using choice probability as the
dependent variable. General support for choice
overload would be demonstrated by a main effect of set size, with the smaller set yielding
more choosing. A set size by time-pressure interaction in which the high-pressure group
showed a larger choice overload effect than the
no-pressure group would demonstrate the importance of time pressure in producing the effect, providing support for the time-out hypothesis. Lastly, a set size by distribution interaction
in which the uniform (but not the exponential)
distribution yielded a choice overload effect
would demonstrate that conflict is an important
component in generating the effect, thereby providing support for the preference change hypothesis. On the other hand, for the same interaction, if the exponential (but not the uniform)
distribution yielded a choice overload effect,
this might demonstrate that time pressure is an
important component in generating the effect
(given that the time-out explanation was stronger at producing the effect in exponential relative to uniform distributions in Jessup et al.,
2009). This would be further strengthened if the
three-way interaction between set size, distribution, and time pressure was significant, and the
effect was more pronounced in the highpressure group, thereby lending support to the
time out hypothesis.
Results
All of the measures and conditions that we
collected are reported here, except for information regarding the quality of choices, which will
be presented in a different article. Unless otherwise noted, the widths of all confidence intervals (CI) indicate the 95th percentile of the
difference between the contrasted means. The
3
It should be noted that 20 studies with N ⫽ 316 —if the
studies do not involve the same participants—will have
independent data, whereas our data are not all independent.

This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.

TIME PRESSURE CAUSES CHOICE OVERLOAD

143

Figure 4. Experimental choice display. Participants were presented with either 15 or three
job applicants, each rated on four attributes, indicated by the bars. If they wanted to hire an
applicant, participants would push the button on the left corresponding with the chosen
applicant. If they did not want to hire any of the applicants, then participants could either wait
until the trial timed out or push the button labeled “select none of these.” See the online article
for the color version of this figure.

overall probability of making a choice was .58
(SD ⫽ .22) and the median response time was
4.21 s (SD ⫽ 2.58). Table 1 shows the percent
of trials on which those in the high pressure
group ran out of time, conditioned on no option
being selected. There was no trial on which
participants in the no-pressure group ran out of
time. Even though the expected value of the
task was negative if selecting at random (see
online supplemental materials), all but four participants earned more than the minimum win
amount of $4, and only one had a negative win
amount; this suggests that participants were sufficiently motivated.
Behavioral Results
Manipulation checks. A first manipulation
check was to see whether there was a higher
choice probability in the exponential distribution condition, consistent with prior research.
There was a higher choice probability in the
exponential distribution condition. This was
tested using the 2 ⫻ 2 ⫻ 2 mixed ANOVA
described in Method, with a significant main
effect for distribution type (CI [0.06, 0.17], F[1,
77] ⫽ 16.48, p ⬍ .001). The probability of
selecting an option in the exponential condition
was .64 compared with .52 in the uniform conTable 1
Percent of Trials on Which High-Pressure Group
Ran Out of Time Among Those on Which No
Option Was Selected, Separated by Distribution
and Set Size
Variable

Small

Large

Exponential
Uniform

.06%
.36%

.19%
.66%

dition. We ran a second manipulation check to
verify that individuals were less likely to make
a choice when options were more conflicting.
They were less likely. This was tested with
logistic regression using the participants’ individual choice data on each trial as the dependent
variable and our conflict measure as an independent variable, the result of which was significant (beta coefficient CI [0.012, 0.17],
t[6318] ⫽ 10.64, p ⬍ .001). The conflict measure was represented by the percent of variance
accounted for by the first principal component,
obtained by running a principal components
analysis on each observed option set, representing a multidimensional version of cosine similarity. Technically this indicates similarity (i.e.,
1 – conflict). Thus, the less conflicting an option
set is, the more likely one is to select an option.
A third manipulation check indicated that the
median response time statistically differed between the time pressure groups (CI [2.16, 3.71],
F[1, 77] ⫽ 57.20, p ⬍ .001), tested via a oneway ANOVA comparing the median response
time of individuals in the high-pressure to nopressure group. As expected, the no-pressure
group had statistically longer response times
(no-pressure group: M ⫽ 5.51 s, SE ⫽ 0.37;
high-pressure group: M ⫽ 2.57, SE ⫽ 0.10).
This indicates that our time pressure manipulation operated as designed. Response time distributions are shown separately for the no-pressure
and high-pressure groups in Figures 5 and 6,
respectively.
Choice overload effect. We tested the following hypotheses using the 2 ⫻ 2 ⫻ 2 mixed
ANOVA described in Method. We first wanted
to know whether individuals selected an option
more when choosing from small option sets
than from large option sets, thereby replicating
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Figure 5. Response time distributions for no-pressure group are separated by distribution type and
set size and no choice (cyan with diagonal pattern) or choice (magenta with horizontal pattern). The
overlap is shown in purple with diagonal pattern. See the online article for the color version of this
figure.

the choice overload effect according to choice
probability. The effect replicated (set size main
effect: CI [.02, .07], F[1, 77] ⫽ 9.73, p ⬍ .003).
The choice probability for small option sets
(M ⫽ .60, SE ⫽ .03) was higher than that for
large option sets (M ⫽ .56, SE ⫽ .02). Continuing, we wanted to determine whether the preference change mechanism for the choice overload effect was supported by the choice
probability data. It was not supported. Individuals were equally likely to make a choice when
options were uniformly relative to exponentially distributed (Set Size ⫻ Distribution interaction: F(1, 77) ⫽ 1.32, p ⬍ .255).
Lastly, we wanted to determine whether the
time-out mechanism for the choice overload

effect was supported by the choice probability
data. It was supported (Set Size ⫻ Time Pressure interaction: CI [.05, .16], F(1, 77) ⫽
14.19, p ⬍ .001). As conveyed by Figure 7
and exactly in line with the time-out hypothesis, there was little difference in choice probability for the no pressure group, regardless of
option set size, whereas the high-pressure
group was substantially more likely to make a
choice from a small compared with a large
option set. This exact pattern of significant
and nonsignificant effects also emerged from
a 2 ⫻ 2 ⫻ 2 mixed ANOVA on participants’
block 1 choices (see Table 2 for additional
results from the ANOVA for which there
were no a priori hypotheses).
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Figure 6. Response time distributions for high-pressure group are separated by distribution
type and set size and no choice (cyan with diagonal pattern) or choice (magenta with
horizontal pattern). The overlap is shown in purple with diagonal pattern. No-choice trials
exclude trials on which the participant timed out. See the online article for the color version
of this figure.

RAMS score as a predictor of choice.
Finally, we wanted to know whether participants’
probability of making a choice bore a relationship
to their RAMS score, a measure of the extent to
which one maximizes or satisfices. There was no
relationship. We tested this by regressing their
RAMS score onto the overall probability of making a choice, F(1, 76) ⫽ 0.41, p ⬍ .527, the
probability difference in making a choice between
the two set sizes within the uniform condition,
F(1, 76) ⫽ 0.76, p ⬍ .784, and within the exponential condition, F(1, 76) ⫽ 0.17, p ⬍ .679, and
the statistical interaction contrast between set size
and time pressure, F(1, 76) ⫽ 0.32, p ⬍ .576.

Thus, even though the RAMS score yielded a
Cronbach’s alpha ⫽ .78, a value that falls in the
acceptable range (George & Mallery, 2003), we
found no evidence that it predicted choice in our
current setting.
Model Simulations
Following Jessup et al. (2009), we used simulations to conduct a grid search; here for each
participant, we ran 100 simulations for each of
their 80 trials using each parameter combination
for each model we tested. Using the probabilistic
response profile from the simulations, we identi-
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Figure 7. Statistical interaction between the time-pressure group and option set size, using
choice probability as the dependent variable. Error bars indicate standard error of the mean.
See the online article for the color version of this figure.

fied the tested parameters that maximized the likelihood of the data, given the models.
Three different models were tested: decision
field theory with the time out exiting method,
decision field theory with the preference change
exiting method, and decision field theory with
both the time out and the preference change
exiting methods.
Decision field theory. Decision field theory evolves according to
P(t ⫹ 1) ⫽ S ⫻ P(t) ⫹ V(t) ⫹ E(t)

(1)

where P(t) represents a J ⫻ 1 preference state
column vector, indicating the level of accumu-

lated preference for each of the J options at time
t. In decision field theory, option j is selected
when the preference state for option j hits the
preset decision threshold . S represents an J ⫻
J distance-dependent lateral inhibition matrix
where cell S2,5 indicates the similarity between
option 2 and option 5. We used a euclidean
distance measure scaled such that maximally
distant (i.e., dissimilar) options had a value of 0
and maximally proximal options had a value of
⫺.1. Effectively, these off-diagonal cells served
to inhibit competing option preferences in a
distance-dependent manner (i.e., the more similar the more the competitive inhibition). The
main diagonal of matrix S represents temporal

Table 2
Additional Results From ANOVA for Which There Were No a Priori Hypotheses
Variable

F(1, 77)

p

Main effect: time pressure
Interaction: Distribution ⫻ Time Pressure
Interaction: Distribution ⫻ Set Size ⫻ Time Pressure

.04
.41
2.78

.84
.52
.10

TIME PRESSURE CAUSES CHOICE OVERLOAD

decay for each option, and the value for each
cell on the diagonal was set to .95. E(t) is a
normally distributed row vector of error at time
t for each preference state according to N(0,1).
The matrix V(t) is the 1 ⫻ J valence vector at
time t and is composed of
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V(t) ⫽ C ⫻ M ⫻ w(t).

(2)

J ⫻ J matrix C effectively represents a 1/J
contrast matrix (having a value of 1 on the main
diagonal) and is used to contrast the J ⫻ K
motivational matrix M, where K represents the
number of attributes, which was four in our
study. In our simulations, the values in M were
normalized to all of the options in our database,
separated by distribution type (i.e., exponential
or uniform) and then shifted such that the minimum value for each attribute was 0. The K ⫻ 1
stochastic column vector w(t) at time t determines which attribute is receiving attention at
each individual time step. We gave each attribute an equal importance weight (wk ⫽ .25 for
all k); in practice, to speed the simulation process, we allowed for each attribute to be turned
on at any moment, as opposed to limiting it to
only one attribute at each time step t.
Time out, preference change, and combined model. To allow decision field theory
to not select an option, an additional component
must be added. For the time-out method, a temporal threshold  is set such that when the
elapsed number of timepoints reaches  without an option being selected, then the decision
process is exited and no options are selected. In
practice, we used a probabilistic , which was
referred to at every time step t. This probabilistic threshold should yield the same effects as
Jessup et al. (2009) while retaining the dynamic
and stochastic modeling spirit of decision field
theory.
For the preference-change method, a preference change threshold ␦ was used such that we
counted every time step t on which a different
option became most preferred relative to the
previous time step t – 1. When this counter
reached ␦, the decision process exited and no
option was selected. As with the time-out
method, in practice, we used a probabilistic
version of ␦ such that on every time step on
which a new option became preferred, there was
some nonzero probability of exiting the choice
process.

147

The combined model utilized both the probabilistic time-out threshold  as well as the
probabilistic preference change threshold ␦ in
the same model.
The grid search ranged from 1 to 20 in increments of .25 for the decision threshold , totaling 77 values for the first dimension. For the
next dimension(s), the probabilistic exit thresholds ( or ␦ or both in the combined model)
ranged from .001 to .999 at the extremes and
otherwise ranged from .02 to .98 in increments
of .02, yielding 51 values. Hence, there were
two free parameters in the first two models and
three free parameters in the combined model.
Model comparison. Each of the three
above models were examined using four different versions for finding the optimal parameter
combinations. The first version sought the best
parameter combination for each participant over
all 80 trials. The second version sought the
best-fitting parameter combination for the
model, separated by distribution type, yielding
40 trials for each parameter combination. The
third version sought the best-fitting parameter
combination for the model, separated by set
size, also yielding 40 trials for each parameter
combination. The fourth version sought the best
parameter combination for each set size and
distribution type, yielding four different parameter combinations total, one combination each
for every 20 trials.
The models were compared using Bayesian
Information Criterion (BIC; Schwartz, 2004), a
method that penalizes models for additional parameters. BIC is computed as
BICm ⫽ ⫺2 · ln(Lm) ⫹ (pm · ln(n))

(3)

where Lm represents the likelihood of model m,
pm represents the degrees of freedom (number
of free parameters) in model m, and n indicates
the number of data points to which the pm
degrees of freedom are applied. The terms after
the addition sign compose the penalty for additional parameters. Because versions 2– 4 of our
models applied the free parameters to restricted
subsets of the data points as opposed to all of
them simultaneously, we used a version of BIC
modified accordingly:
BICm ⫽ ⫺2 · ln(Lm) ⫹ k · (pm · ln(n)).

(4)

This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.

148

JESSUP, RITCHIE, AND HOMER

Here k represents the number of restricted
subsets to which the free parameters were
applied (note that this formulation assumes
that the same number of data points are used
for each parameter combination of the same
size). Consequently, the penalty for version
one of the time-out model is 1· (2· ln[80]) ⫽
8.76 because there were 80 trials to which two
free parameters were applied, all in a single
subset. Comparatively, the penalty for version
four of the combined model is 4· (3· ln[20]) ⫽
35.95 because three free parameters were separately applied to each subset containing 20
data points and four total subsets.
Each version of each model was compared
with a 0-parameter baseline model, which assumed that participants merely selected options (or selected no option) at random.
Hence, for an experimental model to outperform the baseline model, (a) participants must
act in a nonrandom manner (b) that the experimental model is able to detect. The BIC of
this 0-baseline model is the same for all participants and is
BICBaseline0 ⫽ ⫺2 · [40 · ln(1 ⁄ 4)
⫹ 40 · ln(1 ⁄ 16)] ⫽ 332.71.

(5)

In the formulation used in this paper, the
model performance increases as the BIC value
decreases.
Simulation results. Statistics from the
model simulations are shown in Table 3. As one
can see, the BIC values for each version of each
model outperforms the baseline model which
has a BIC value of 332.71. Hence, participants
did not merely choose at random, and every
model version of decision field theory was able
to detect this nonrandomness and adjust accordingly. The best BIC was obtained by version 4
of the time-out model and the second best was
obtained by version 2 of the same model (although several other versions of the other models do nearly as well). Nonetheless, consistent
with the conclusions from our behavioral results, the time-out model appears to be a superior predictor of choice overload effects when
compared with the preference change model.
Table 4 presents the median best-fitting parameter values for version 4 of the time-out model,
separated by pressure group. We further wanted
to know whether these best-fitting parameters
differed between our pressure groups. There
was one difference. This was tested using a
two-tailed Wilcoxon’s rank sum test for each
between-group pair of parameter values. The 

Table 3
Simulation Statistics
Model

Version

Mean ⫺2 ⫻ ln(Lm)

Penalty

BIC

1
2
3
4

161.91
149.97
153.99
138.85

8.76
14.76
14.76
23.97

170.67
164.73
168.75
162.82

1
2
3
4

161.31
151.71
154.76
143.59

8.76
14.76
14.76
23.97

170.07
166.47
169.52
167.56

1
2
3
4

154.30
143.29
146.43
133.14

13.15
22.13
22.13
35.95

167.45
165.42
168.56
169.09

Time out

Preference change

Combined

Percent best fit
49.4%
11.4%
10.1%
10.1%
17.7%
40.5%
10.1%
21.5%
5.1%
3.8%
10.1%
8.9%
.0%
1.2%
.0%

Note. BIC ⫽ Bayesian Information Criterion. Each version of each model was optimized to the data at the individual
participant level using a grid search over parameter values by maximizing ⫺2 ⫻ log likelihood of each model, given the
data (see main text for differences in versions and tested value ranges). BIC penalizes models for additional free parameters
and equals ⫺2 ⫻ Ln(LM) ⫹ penalty; the BIC values may not sum correctly with the other values in the table because of
rounding error. Lower values of BIC indicate superior performance.
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Table 4
Median Best-Fitting Parameters for the Best-Fitting Model: Time Out Version 4
Group

Set size

Distribution





Small
Small
Large
Large

Exponential
Uniform
Exponential
Uniform

9.75
17.00
9.37
10.75

.36
.11
.38
.53

Small
Small
Large
Large

Exponential
Uniform
Exponential
Uniform

9.75
15.75
7.00
10.25

.28
.12
.40
.70

No pressure
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High pressure

Note.  controls the extent to which individuals accumulate more preference before a
choice; higher values indicate more preference required before selecting an option.  controls
the extent to which individuals probabilistically exit from the decision process without
selecting an option; higher values indicate an increased likelihood of exiting the decision
process without selecting an option, holding  constant.

for the high-pressure group in the large uniform
condition was significantly higher than its respective counterpart for the no-pressure group
(z ⫽ ⫺2.06, p ⬍ .040), indicating that the
model best fit the former group by setting a
significantly more urgent time-out threshold relative to the no-pressure group. Interestingly,

this occurred without any response time data
used in the model fitting.
Figure 8 plots the probability of making a
choice as predicted by version 4 of the time-out
model, separated by distribution, set size, and
pressure condition together with the mean observed probabilities and the standard error for

Figure 8. Model simulations showing the mean choice probability from the time-out
mechanism, separated by distribution type, option set size, and pressure group. Error bars
indicate standard error of the mean for the observed choice probability data from participants,
centered on the mean. See the online article for the color version of this figure.
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each observed choice probability. As can be
observed, version 4 of the time-out model sufficiently predicts the overall probability of making or, more importantly, the probability of not
making a choice.
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Discussion
First, the fact that we replicated the choice
overload effect is noteworthy. The overall effect
is rather small—as denoted by the confidence
intervals—rendering the conflicting metaanalyses more understandable. Moreover, interpretation of this main effect is tempered by the
observation of statistical interaction effects
from our other analyses.
Second, only one of the two potential cognitive mechanisms from Jessup et al. (2009) was
supported, despite both being classified within
the decision difficulty moderator (Chernev et
al., 2015). Interestingly, the preference change
mechanism of decision field theory received no
support despite the fact that it encompassed the
notion of conflict overwhelming individuals
thereby precluding choice, an idea central to
many of the initial observations and reports of
the choice overload and other similar deferral
effects (Iyengar et al., 2000; Schwartz, 2004;
Tversky et al., 1992). Nonetheless, the effect on
choice deferral of alignable and nonalignable
sets (Gourville et al., 2005), represented in our
data as similarity (or the inverse of conflict), is
supported via our second manipulation check.
One resolution to this apparent conflict in results is that the flaw may be in the preference
change mechanism as presently implemented
by decision field theory. Perhaps individuals
alter their behavior beyond the underlying assumptions of decision field theory, depending
on the different factors that were tested here. If
the assumptions of the preference change mechanism are wrong, then the choice overload effect may fail to materialize where predicted.
Probing this represents one of many avenues of
future exploration exposed by the present work.
We found strong support for the time-out
mechanism of decision field theory for choice
overload, that is, individuals under time pressure are less likely to make a choice from large
(relative to small) sets of options. This is also
consistent with other recent findings that many
choice deferral effects can be explained by a

dynamic model that incorporates deferral via a
temporal threshold (Bhatia & Mullett, 2016).
Haynes (2009) also tested time pressure as a
potential mechanism for the choice overload
effect. Yet he examined a fundamentally different set of dependent variables and his findings
were rather mixed. Dhar et al. (1999) narrowly
examined the effect that time pressure exerts on
choice deferral but their study differed from
ours in significant aspects, including only one
set size (two) and a time-pressure condition that
was more similar in time allowed for choosing
to our no-pressure condition. Their work highlights some effect of time pressure in small sets,
whereas we show support for the effect across
both small and large sets.
Third, modeling via simulations add to the
behavioral findings. Although the tested models
predicted the effect (Jessup et al., 2009), their
predictions were no guarantee (a) that the effect
would emerge (Scheibehenne et al., 2010) or (b)
emerge in a manner consistent with the models.
Nonetheless, the model fitting results supported
the behavioral results and the comparison of
best-fitting parameter values, demonstrating
that the model incorporated notions of time
pressure despite not receiving any explicit information regarding time pressure beyond the
options considered and the choice made.
It is possible that the choice overload effects
that we observed were driven by learning, rather
than decision, effects; such learning effects were
possible because of the repeated nature of our
design. The fact that our results were identical,
even when considering the first block of responses
(i.e., before feedback was given), suggests that the
effects did emerge rather quickly, and, if because
of learning, then the learning occurred in the absence of feedback.
It is also possible that the usage of visually
presented bars made dominance easier to detect
(see Figure 4) in our experimental task relative
to typical tasks. Because of the lack of highdensity process data (e.g., eye tracking), it is
difficult to know for certain what participants
were considering when making their selections;
when asked to describe their strategy, 60% of
participants mentioned that they examined the
attributes with approximately two thirds of
these reporting that they focused on one to two
attributes (the attributes in focus differed between participants).
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Although the particular application of time
pressure in the present task was rather unrealistic, the goal of this manipulation was to effectively force this experimental group to act in
accordance with the time-out explanation to see
whether it could produce the effect. More ecologically valid efforts could be attempted in
future work (e.g., finding individuals who are
already in a hurry, etc.).
We did not find support for the hypothesis
that the extent to which one is a maximizer, as
indicated by one’s RAMS score, influenced the
prevalence of choice overload. A more thorough examination might have revealed an effect, but this was not a primary concern so we
chose not to pursue it.
We believe that, consistent with Scheibehenne et al. (2010), the choice overload effect
probably does not emerge very often. Here in
contrived experimental circumstances meant to
elicit the effect, we found a small one at the
overall level (Cohen’s d ⫽ .18). When under
time pressure, the effect increases (Cohen’s d ⫽
.42) to a medium effect size. Both of the above
points are important: The effect is small but
time pressure exacerbates it. Taken as a whole,
our findings lend credence to an approach for
understanding consumer choice via underlying
cognitive processes, representing yet another
successful foray of cognitive models such as
decision field theory into the consumer choice
field (Roe et al., 2001).
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